What is the optimal allocation of prizes in an innovation race?
Introduction
What is the optimal allocation of prizes in an innovation race? 1 Should the winner take all, or is it preferable that …rst inventors share the market with independent duplicators, if and when they materialize? A few papers have recently addressed that issue 2 , arriving at the conclusion that a permissive regime, in which late independent inventors are allowed to compete with the …rst inventor, is generally preferable to the winner-take-all regime. The purpose of the present paper is to caution that this conclusion is based on restrictive assumptions, and that the winner-take-all system can in fact be socially optimal in a broad set of circumstances.
The case against the winner-take-all system is essentially based upon the notion that the innovator obtains all of its pro…ts as a monopolist, whereas in a permissive regime part of its overall reward will come from oligopoly pro…ts. This leads to the use of the so-called Kaplow ratio test (Kaplow, 1984) to identify which regime minimizes the social costs per unit of incentives to innovate it provides. According to this test, the winner-take-all principle is preferable if:
where stands for the deadweight losses associated with …rms' market power and for individual pro…ts, and the indices m and d stand for monopoly and duopoly, respectively. 3 Inequality (1) states that it is more distorting to raise an euro of pro…ts under duopoly than under monopoly. This test, however, can be passed only in exceptional circumstances, i.e., when the demand function is extremely convex: with linear or constant 1 Economists have recently devoted a lot of attention to the issue of the allocation of prizes in contests: see e.g. Taylor (1995) , Fullerton and McAfee (1999) , Moldovanu and Sela (2001) and Che and Gale (2003) . However, innovation races di¤er from research contests in two important ways. First, research contests end on a speci…ed date, whereas an innovation race ends whenever the innovation is achieved. As a consequence, in a contest the timing is …xed but the amount of innovative knowledge produced is variable, whereas in an innovation race the R&D output is …xed but the timing of innovation is variable. Second, the prize in a contest is typically a sum of money, whereas in an innovation race it amounts to some degree of market power. While the social cost of raising a …xed sum of money is independent of its division, the deadweight losses caused by innovators'market power generally depend on the degree of exclusivity they enjoy.
2 See La Manna et al. (1989) , Maurer and Scotchmer (2002) , Shapiro (2006) , Henry (2007) . For a di¤erent perspective, see Kullti et al. (2006 Kullti et al. ( , 2007 3 The test can be easily restated for the case of a triopoly or, more generally, an oligopoly with any number of active …rms. elasticity demand, for instance, inequality (1) is never met. Hence the conclusion that the winner-take-all system is generally ine¢ cient.
For Kaplow's test to apply, however, the incentives to innovate must equal industry pro…ts. We contend that this is appropriate only under special assumptions. In an innovation race, the incentives to innovate typically depend not only on aggregate discounted industry pro…ts, but also on the division of the pro…ts between early and late innovators. As is well known, the equilibrium R&D expenditure in an innovation race increases with both the prize to the winner (the pro…t incentive) and the di¤erence between the prize to the winner and to the losers (the competitive threat). 4 One virtue of the winner-take-all system is that it maximizes the competitive threat by making the "consolation prize" in the innovation race vanish.
Another virtue of the winner-take-all system is that it prevents wasteful duplication of e¤orts. In a regime in which late independent inventors are allowed to share the market with the …rst inventor, there is an incentive to continue to invest in R&D even after the …rst inventor has succeeded. If the late independent invention re-produces identically the original innovation, these duplication e¤orts are completely wasteful from the social viewpoint. Even if duplication results in di¤erentiated products or devices, the incentive to engage in duplicative activity may be excessively high because of a business stealing e¤ect and so preventing such activity may be socially valuable.
We develop a modi…ed test that accounts for these e¤ects and combines them with those identi…ed in the earlier literature. In our baseline model, two …rms race for an innovation. Firms choose their R&D expenditures, which determine the expected date of successful completion of their R&D projects according to a Poisson discovery process. In the winner-take-all system, as soon as one …rm innovates the other stops investing in R&D since it will be precluded from exploiting the innovation anyway. In the alternative, more permissive system, the laggard can invest to duplicate the innovation and when it also succeeds the market becomes a duopoly.
There are three main di¤erences between the modi…ed ratio test we arrive at in this model and Kaplow's test. First and foremost, the modi…ed test compares the ratio between deadweight losses and individual pro…ts, not industry pro…ts -under duopoly and monopoly, respectively. If oligopoly competition is not too intense, this ratio can be lower under monopoly than under duopoly even with a linear, or moderately concave, demand curve. This change re ‡ects the fact that the pro…t incentive depends only on the 4 See Beath, Kautsolacos and Ulph (1989). pro…ts to the winner of the race, not those to the loser. Second, the ratio between the deadweight losses and individual pro…ts under duopoly is multiplied by a factor greater than one, which re ‡ects the fact that the duopoly pro…ts accruing to the loser not only do not raise the pro…t incentive, but in fact lower the competitive threat. This factor increases with the intensity of the race, i.e., the equilibrium level of R&D investment, which determines the strength of the competitive threat. Finally, the social cost of a permissive regime is augmented by an index of the costliness of duplication, which accounts for the social costs of wasteful duplication.
Overall, in our baseline model the winner-take-all system turns out to be socially optimal under much broader circumstances than Kaplow's test would suggest. In particular, it is more likely to be optimal the weaker is the intensity of product market competition, the faster is the innovation race, and the greater are the duplication costs.
Moving beyond the baseline model, we analyze a number of extensions, such as technology licensing, the possibility that duplicative activity may not be completely wasteful, free entry, and the case in which R&D expenditures are a up-front payment rather than ‡ow expenditures. For each of these extensions, we discuss how our modi…ed ratio test changes. Even though in some extensions the appropriate test becomes more di¢ cult to pass than in the baseline model, Kaplow's test is re-obtained only in extreme cases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses various concrete policy issues that turn on the choice of the winner-take-all or a more permissive system. Section 3 develops the baseline model and derives our modi…ed ratio test. Section 4 assesses the likelihood that the modi…ed ratio test be passed, contrasting it with the original Kaplow test. Section 5 analyzes a number of extensions, showing how the appropriate test changes as our assumptions are relaxed. Section 6 concludes the paper. All proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
Policy issues
Although our analysis is abstract in nature, it can provide useful insights on various legal rules and policy decisions of governments, antitrust authorities, and the courts. Before delving into the analysis of the optimal allocation of prizes in innovation races, in this section we discuss several concrete policy issues that have recently attracted a lot of attention and turn on the optimality of the winner-take-all principle.
Patents, secrets, and copyrights
A major di¤erence between patents and other protection mechanisms, such as copyrights and trade secrets, is that patent protection precludes the commercial exploitation of independently duplicated innovative knowledge, while copyright or trade secret protection does not. In other words, independent invention is a defense against copyright or trade secret infringement, but is not a defense to patent infringement.
Whether patent or trade secret protection provide incentives to innovate at the least social cost is an issue that is interesting in its own right. 5 However, it has also some practical policy implications. Let us consider, for instance, the issue of which technological …elds should be eligible to patent protection. 6 Since in the absence of patent protection innovators must rely on secrecy, this choice ultimately turn on whether patents are superior to secrecy as a protection mechanism. Similar remarks apply to the issue of whether innovative products such as software programs or databases should be protected by patents or copyrights. Patents embody the winner-take-all principle, whereas copyrights constitute an example of a protection mechanisms incorporating an independent-invention defense. 7
Multiple patents
Although patents are the prototypical example of the winner-take-all system, the introduction of an independent invention defense into the patent system has itself recently become a topical issue. In an early paper, La Manna, McLeod and De Meza (1989) make a case for "multiple patents," i.e. for granting patent protection to all inventors that independently re-discover an innovation within some pre-speci…ed time period since the …rst invention. More recent work by Maurer and Scotchmer (2002) , Shapiro (2006), and Henry (2007) also …nds that an independent invention defense can be socially desirable under certain assumptions.
5 See e.g. Denicolò and Franzoni (2004) . 6 This issue arises times and again as technical progress often results in the creation of entirely new industries, such as the software industry in the 1960s and 1970s. Recently the American patent system has experienced an unprecedented broadening of patentability. There are now thousands of patents for living organisms, genetic sequences, business methods etc., none of which would have been patentable in the 1970s. Things are somewhat di¤erent in Europe, where business methods and software patents are still controversial and gene patents are much harder to uphold than in the US. 7 Of course, the optimality of the winner-take-all principle captures only one aspect of the problem and there are many other dimensions to these policy choices.
Building on these results, several authors have argued in favor of a general reduction of patent holders'prerogatives with respect to infringing followers, in spite of the obvious di¢ culties in the practical implementation of an independent invention defense. Vermont (2006) and Lemley (2007) argue that those di¢ culties may not be insurmountable after all. However, our analysis shows that this policy move is not necessarily desirable even abstracting from any practical di¢ culty in its implementation.
Open v. closed standards
The degree to which an innovation race exhibits the winner-take-all property may depend not only on the structure of intellectual property (IP) rights, but also on technological e¤ects such as learning by doing or network externalities. Even in these cases, however, policy can in ‡uence whether and to what extent innovators can enjoy an exclusive monopoly or must share the market with laggards.
Let us consider, for instance, an industry exhibiting network externalities. Suppose that IP rights alone do not guarantee that the winner takes all: for instance, innovators are protected by secrecy or copyrights, so that late inventors can practice their innovations lawfully. With network externalities, however, even a short lead time may allow the …rst inventor to build an installed base large enough to create an e¤ective barrier to entry. This means that independent duplicators could enter the market only by designing compatible products, which may be very di¢ cult or even impossible to do if inter-operability information is kept secret.
If, however, the …rst inventor were compelled to disclose the inter-operability information, followers could achieve compatibility much more easily and so the barrier to entry would collapse. This scenario is not just a theoretical possibility. Recent litigation between the European Commission and Microsoft shows that such mandatory disclosure of inter-operability information is a very concrete risk for …rms holding dominant positions in Europe. Following the recent decision of the Court of First Instance -which upheld the Commission's …nding that Microsoft's conduct was abusive and that mandatory disclosure of inter-operability information was an appropriate remedy -the Commission might, for instance, request Apple to disclose secret information on its i-Pod, or Ibm to disclose inter-operability information related to its computer operating system, in order to open those markets to competition.
Our analysis highlights the negative consequences of mandatory disclosure of secret innovative knowledge. We recognize that by forcing to disclose inter-operability information, the antitrust authorities may manage to spur ex post competition. However, were such a policy to be adopted systematically, it would dilute the incentives to innovate by making the prize to the losers of the race more attractive. Our modi…ed ratio test accounts for both e¤ects, showing that the social costs of the competition restored, or arti…cially created, by a mandatory disclosure policy may exceed its social bene…ts. This is more likely to be the case in highly innovative industries where innovations occur very frequently.
Patent breadth
Even without multiple patents, the extent to which the patent system effectively exhibits the winner-take-all property depends on the "breadth" of patent protection. If patents are narrow in scope, there may be plenty of room for duplicating the innovation lawfully (Gallini, 1992) ; if instead patents have a broad coverage, the monopoly they create is more persistent. 8 Let us consider, for instance, the prevalence of so-called "me-too" drugs in pharmaceuticals. Given that pharmaceutical patents usually protect innovative molecules rather than the therapeutic process through which such molecules operate, there is scope for creating duplicative drugs that exploit the same therapeutic process but consist of di¤erent chemical substances. Currently, not only are these me-too drugs non-infringing, they can actually be patented themselves. If instead it were possible to patent the therapeutic process itself (this of course requires that such process be identi…ed, which is still not true of many e¤ective therapies), this would discourage duplicative research in the pharmaceutical sector and, conversely, would create a great incentive to switch resources to really innovative projects.
The modi…ed ratio test
Many economists recognize the bene…ts of a switch to a regime that embodies more of the winner-take-all principle in pharmaceuticals, but the bene…ts of similar moves in other sectors are more controversial. To gain some insights into the key determinants of the welfare comparison between the winnertake-all and more permissive systems of protection, in this section we develop our baseline model and derive the modi…ed ratio test.
Model outline
Two symmetric …rms, A and B, compete to obtain an innovation. The nature of the innovation is exogenous: to …x ideas, imagine that the innovation creates a new product. However, the timing of the innovation is endogenously determined as a probabilistic function of the amount invested in R&D by the two …rms. For each …rm i, the R&D e¤ort determines the expected time of successful completion of the R&D project according to a Poisson discovery process with a hazard rate equal to x i (i = A; B). The projects of the two …rms are independent, so that the aggregate instantaneous probability of success is simply the sum of the individual probabilities. Firm i sustains a ‡ow cost c(x i ) when exerting e¤ort x i :
When one …rm innovates, it can start to market the new good earning monopoly pro…t m per period. In the winner-take-all regime, the innovator's monopoly terminates at some date (e.g., when IP protection expires), when the innovation falls into the public domain and competition drives pro…ts to zero. In the peprmissive regime, by contrast, the innovation can be duplicated. As soon as one …rm innovates, the other …rm starts to invest to catch up (duplicate). Like innovation, duplication occurs according to a Poisson process whose hazard rate y depends on the laggard's duplication e¤ort. When the laggard also succeeds, the industry becomes a duopoly and each …rm obtains d per period. For simplicity, we assume that in the permissive regime duopoly pro…ts lasts inde…nitely, but all that matters is that they last more than monopoly pro…ts in the winner-take-all regime (otherwise it would be impossible to compare the two regimes holding the level of the incentives to innovate constant). For the time being, we also assume that the …rst inventor does not license the innovative knowledge to the other …rm. 9 Let s (y) be the duplication cost function. One could imagine that s(:) = c(:), i.e. that a …rm's innovative capabilities are not a¤ected by its competitor's achievement. However, to keep the model more general we allow these cost functions to di¤er, 10 making only the standard regularity assumption that both are twice di¤erentiable, increasing and convex:
Let us consider the innovation race. The R&D e¤orts x i are determined as the Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous moves game between …rm A and …rm B. 11 Firm i's expected pro…t is
where x i is own R&D e¤ort, x j is the competitor's R&D e¤ort, P W is the reward to winner of the race and P L to the loser, both to be determined presently. The reaction function of …rm i is given by the …rst-order condition of the problem of maximizing i with respect to x i for any given x j . We obtain:
The …rst term in (3) is proportional to the pro…t incentive P W , which would be the only determinant of the incentive to innovate if …rm i raced alone (x j = 0). The second term is proportional to the competitive threat P W P L , which, by contrast, captures the incentive to take over the competitor and turn from second to the …rst prize. Notice that the larger is the instantaneous probability that …rm j makes the discovery, relegating …rm i to the second position, the more important is the competitive threat.
Since …rms are symmetric, we focus on the symmetric equilibrium where
In a symmetric equilibrium we have
Assuming that the equilibrium is stable, 12 it is immediate to verify the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 In a symmetric equilibrium of the innovation race, if the equilibrium is stable (i.e., if dx i dx j < 1) then equilibrium R&D e¤ orts increase with the prize to the winner P W and decrease with the prize to the loser:
1 1 In principle, …rms could choose di¤erent levels of R&D e¤orts at di¤erent points in time. Note, however, that the game is stationary in the sense that at each point in time, given no success to date, …rms face exactly the same payo¤ functios as at time 0. Subgame perfection then ensures that equilibrium R&D e¤orts will be constant over time until one …rm innovates: see Reinganum (1989) for details.
1 2 Stability of the equilibrium is guaranteed by the condition Lee and Wilde, 1980 , Beath et al., 1989 , and Nti, 1999 .
The consolation prize P L impacts negatively the incentive to innovate because it lowers the competitive threat. Notice that the Lemma takes the prizes P W and P L as given. In reality, variables that a¤ect the consolation prize may also indirectly impact the prize to the winner by speeding up or slowing down the duplication process, as we shall see presently.
The permissive regime
How are the rewards P W and P L determined? Let us start with the permissive regime in which independent inventors are allowed to practice the innovation and compete with the …rst inventor. Here, the loser's reward equals the discounted duopoly pro…ts it obtains upon duplication, less duplication costs:
where IID stands for independent invention defense. Since the maximand in (5) is concave, the solution to the maximization problem is given by the …rst-order condition
Let y denote the optimal duplication e¤ort, which, by implicit di¤erentia-tion, increases with d . De…ne = y y +r < 1 as the "discounting adjusted" probability of duplication: with a Poisson duplication process, the innovation will eventually be duplicated with probability one, but since there is discounting, a delayed duplication counts less than instant duplication. Then, we can write
Turning to the innovator's reward, this is given by
The …rst line of (8) says that the innovator earns monopoly pro…ts until the loser duplicates, which happens with instantaneous probability y . After duplication, both …rms obtain duopoly pro…ts d . The second line says that the innovator's reward can be regarded as a weighted average of monopoly and duopoly discounted pro…ts, with weights re ‡ecting the "discounting adjusted" probability of duplication. Clearly, P IID W > P IID L . In the permissive regime, both the pro…t incentive P IID W and the competitive threat P IID W P IID 2 depend on monopoly and duopoly ‡ow pro…ts. In particular, the competitive threat
does not depend on duopoly pro…ts directly, since …rms get duopoly pro…ts independently of the order of arrival, but does so indirectly, via the investment in duplication y .
The winner-take-all regime
In the winner-take-all regime, by de…nition the prize for the second innovator is zero (P W T A L = 0). The prize for the …rst innovator, assuming that it holds a monopoly for a time period of length T , is
where 1 e rT is the normalized length of the …rst inventor's monopoly.
Welfare comparison
We now compare the two regimes in terms of social welfare. We use the standard de…nition of social welfare in a partial equilibrium framework, namely the sum of consumer and producer surplus. We denote by v the ‡ow social value of the innovation once it is in the public domain. If instead the innovation is used exclusively by one …rm, society su¤ers a ‡ow monopoly deadweight loss m and so the social bene…t is only v m per period. When both …rms practice the innovation and the product market is a duopoly, the deadweight loss is generally lower, d m . In the winner-take-all regime, monopoly ends when the innovation falls into the public domain. Thus, expected social welfare is
The term inside square brackets is the discounted social value of the innovation, accounting for the monopoly distortions that prevail for a period of discounted length . The coe¢ cient 2x 2x +r is the "discounting adjusted" probability that the innovation is achieved (the hazard rate is 2x since who innovates is a matter of indi¤erence for society), and the last term is the total discounted R&D expenditure.
In the permissive regime, things are slightly more complicated. Expected social welfare is
The term inside square brackets re ‡ects the fact that now monopoly prevails only until the innovation is duplicated, which occurs with an instantaneous probability y . After duplication, the market becomes a duopoly and society su¤ers a lower deadweight loss, d , forever. As long as duplication has not occurred yet, however, the laggard also sustains the duplication cost s(y ).
The second line of (12) expresses these e¤ects in terms of the discounting adjusted probability of duplication . Generally speaking, the comparison between W W T A and W IID is complicated by the fact that the equilibrium R&D e¤ort x may di¤er across regimes. Since we are interested in ascertaining which rule, winner-take-all or independent-invention-defense, provides incentives to innovate more e¢ -ciently, we perform the welfare comparison assuming that the incentives to innovate, and hence the R&D e¤orts, are the same in both regimes. That is, we assume that the level of protection in the winner-take-all regime is adjusted so as to yield the same level of equilibrium R&D expenditure as in the permissive regime. In a comparison between patents and secrets, for instance, one can imagine that the level of patent protection is chosen so as to generate the same R&D e¤orts one obtains under secrecy.
From the equilibrium condition (4), we immediately see that in order to get the same innovation e¤orts in the two regimes we must have
that is P
where = x x +r is the stand-alone, discounting-adjusted probability of success. The prize to the winner required to obtain the same equilibrium R&D investment is lower in the winner-take-all regime than in the permissive regime because the consolation prize reduces the incentives to innovate. The di¤erence between the two …rst prizes, P W T A W and P IID W , increases with the size of the consolation prize and also with . Intuitively, the more intense is the race to innovate, the stronger is the adverse incentive e¤ect of the consolation prize, and hence the more important is the competitive threat.
To proceed, note that the consolation prize can be rewritten as
where
can be interpreted as a relative index of the costliness of duplication. It represents the share of expected discounted duopoly pro…ts, d r , which are absorbed by duplication costs.
ranges from 0 (costless duplication) to 1 (duplication is so costly as to absorb all expected revenues). Let us consider …rst the case in which duplication is costless so that = 0. 13 Proposition 2 (The modi…ed ratio test) If duplication is costless ( = 0), the winner-take-all regime is preferable to the permissive regime in terms of social welfare if
where = x x +r is the stand-alone, discounting-adjusted probability of success.
The left-hand side of the modi…ed ratio test (17) represents the social cost per unit of incentive to innovate in the permissive regime, the righthand side that of the winner-take-all regime. With zero duplication costs, the social cost includes only the monopoly or duopoly deadweight losses. . This factor increases with the speed of the innovation race .
These di¤erences have natural economic explanations. With zero duplication costs, the total reward P W + P L equals discounted industry pro…ts in both regimes. The important point, however, is that the incentives to innovate do not depend only on the aggregate prize P W + P L , but also on its division between the innovator and the duplicator. This has two consequences. First, in the permissive regime only the prize to the winner P W has a positive e¤ect on the incentive to innovate, and the prize to the winner includes only the duopoly pro…t accruing to the …rst inventor. This explains why the ratio on the left-hand side of (17) is
Second, the duopoly pro…t earned by the duplicator enters P L , not P W . As such, not only duopoly pro…ts accruing to the loser of the race do not contribute positively to the incentive to innovate, but actually they lower such an incentive by increasing the consolation prize. This negative e¤ect on the competitive threat is captured by the factor 1 that multiplies d on the denominator of the left-hand side of (17). This term decreases with because, as we already know, the importance of the competitive threat depends positively on the intensity of the innovation race. Summarizing, duopoly pro…ts provide low-powered incentives to innovate as compared to monopoly pro…ts because only duopoly pro…ts accruing to the …rst inventor stimulate innovation, whereas those accruing to the duplicator actually slow it down.
With costly duplication, the modi…ed ratio test becomes (see the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix):
The left-hand side is augmented by a term proportional to the index of the costliness of duplication, . One would expect that duplication costs, which are borne only in the permissive regime, further favors the winner-take-all system and this is, indeed, what typically happens. However, inspection of (18) reveals that the additional term on the left-hand side may actually be negative. This requires that m > m , a condition that can only hold in rather special circumstances when products are homogeneous, but is not extreme with di¤erentiated products. The intuitive explanation is that while duplication costs are socially wasteful, they also lower the consolation prize and so increase the incentive to innovate for any given level of monopoly and duopoly pro…ts. Therefore, duplication costs have two opposing e¤ects on social welfare in the permissive regime; generally speaking, either e¤ect can prevail.
Preliminary assessment
How large are the additional e¤ects captured by our modi…ed ratio test? Does the optimality of the winner-take-all principle remain a purely theoretical possibility even accounting for these a¤ects, or does it become a realistic possibility? In this section we address these questions.
It is di¢ cult to do so without making further assumptions, however, because some of the variables that appear in the modi…ed ratio test, such as and , are endogenous, and others, such as , depend on the shape of the demand curve and the intensity of competition. To get a sense of the likelihood of the conditions under which the modi…ed ratio test is passed, let us consider the case of a product innovation. Assume that the demand function for the new product is linear, so that after suitable normalization it can be written as p = 1 Q, where p is price and Q = q A + q B is total output. The unit production cost of the new product is normalized to 0, and demand and costs are assumed to be stationary.
At the monopoly equilibrium, we have m = ). This simple linear demand example is a useful benchmark, since it is easy to check that the Kaplow ratio test cannot be passed for any level of the intensity of competition.
What about our modi…ed ratio test? Inserting the above formulas into (18), the modi…ed ratio test becomes
Inspection of (19) immediately proves the following Lemma:
Lemma 3 With a linear demand function and homogeneous products, the winner-take-all regime is more likely to be optimal:
(i) the lower the intensity of competition in duopoly, ;
(ii) the greater the costliness of duplication, ;
(iii) the lower the interest rate, r; (iv) the lower the expected waiting time to discovery, 1
x . Figure 1 illustrates. The region where the winner-take-all system is preferable is the one that lies below the upward sloping line. Two such lines are depicted in the Figure, one for = 0 and the other for = 1 3 . When 1 2 , the upward sloping line collapses to a point, the north-east vertex of the rectangle, and the winner-take-all system dominates the permissive system for all value of the intensity of competition and of the intensity of the race. To assess the likelihood that the winner-take-all system is preferable, it is important to get a sense of what values for are reasonable. The variable = x x +r depends on the real interest rate r and the instantaneous probability of discovery x . The real interest rate may perhaps range from 3% to 10%. As for x , noting that 1 x is the expected time to discovery, a value of 10% means that a …rm innovates every 10 years and with two symmetric …rms the expected waiting time to discovery is 5 years. This seems to correspond to a highly innovative industry. Instead, a value of 2% means that a …rm innovates every 50 years. Private …rms rarely engage in research activities when the chances of success are so remote. Thus, although x ; and hence , is an endogenous variables, it seems unlikely that is lower than 0.2, whereas in highly innovative industry can be as large as 0.8 or even greater. A glance at Figure 2 reveals that if ranges from 0.2 to 0.8 or more, the winner-take-all principle can be optimal even if competition is substantially more intense that Cournot competition -even with zero duplication costs. Expressing the intensity of competition as the percentage increase of aggregate duopoly output over monopoly output, one …nds that with = 0:2, the maximum percentage increase consistent with the optimality of the winner-take-all regime is 43%, whereas with = 0:8 it is more than 80%! Thus, only a very large increase in output can justify the permissive regime.
Summarizing, in the linear demand case our modi…ed ratio test is met in a broad set of circumstances, whereas Kaplow's ratio test could never be met. This suggests that the new e¤ects accounted for by the modi…ed ratio test are not negligible in magnitude. Thus, there is a real possibility that the winner-take-all principle is, indeed, optimal.
Extensions
In this section we analyze several extensions of the baseline model to test the robustness of our results. This exercise serves to address several concerns: that duplication may not be entirely wasteful, that duplication costs may be saved through appropriate licensing agreements, and that the optimality of the winner-take-all system may be an artifact of the particular way in which we model the innovation race.
Creative duplication
One concern is that if the innovations targeted by the two …rms are not exactly identical, duplication may increase product variety and so may not be entirely wasteful. To address this possibility, we now look more carefully into the determinants of the ratios Let us allow the duplicator to supply a product that is di¤erent from that supplied by the innovator; more precisely, we assume that the two products are horizontally di¤erentiated. Following the classic formulation of Singh and Vives (1984) , let the utility function of the representative consumer be
where m is the numeraire and d 2 [0; 1] is a parameter that captures the degree of substitutability between products. The two goods are independent for d = 0; and are perfects substitutes for d = 1 (the case considered above). The corresponding inverse demand functions are
Again, production costs are normalized to 0. When both products are supplied and prices are set equal to marginal costs (i.e., q A = q B = 1 1+d ), social surplus is maximum and equals v = 2 : Subtracting the sum of producer and consumer surplus under duopoly from the …rst best benchmark, we get
It follows
As for monopoly, imagining that the …rst inventor can only produce its own variety we have m = 
Note that there are two sources of monopoly deadweight losses here: high prices and low variety. The latter component of the welfare loss is due to our assumption that the …rst inventor cannot itself seek to discover the other variety. This assumption is restrictive, but allows us to address the issue of the social value of "creative"duplication in its purest form. Clearly, relaxing this assumption would favor the winner-take-all system.
We are now ready to compare the two regimes. As before, we start from the case = 0 since the role of the costliness of duplication is better considered in isolation. In this case, using (17) it turns out that the winnertake-all system is preferable when
which is more likely to hold if competition is weak and the innovation race is intense. What is the e¤ect of a change in the degree of product di¤erentiation? Di¤erentiating (25) we get:
Proposition 4 With creative duplication, an increase in the degree of product di¤ erentiation militates in favor of the winner-take-all system when the race is not very intense, i.e., < 3 5 , otherwise, it militates against the winner-take-all system.
The reason why the e¤ect of an increase in product di¤erentiation is uncertain is that greater product di¤erentiation a¤ects the comparison between the two regimes in two opposing ways. On the one hand, greater di¤erenti-ation makes duplication more valuable -duplication enlarges the variety of products available to consumers. On the other hand, greater di¤erentiation relaxes competition, allowing …rms to charge higher prices and thereby increasing the ratio . Which e¤ect prevails depends on the intensity of the innovation race. Figure 2 depicts the region where the winner-take-all system is preferable as a function of and d for various values of the intensity of competition corresponding to collusion, Cournot competition, and Bertrand competition. It is remarkable that the winner-take-all system can be desirable even if products are completely independent (d = 0), provided that the innovation race is very intense: to be precise, the condition is > 3 5 . Here, in a permissive system each …rm would conduct its research as a monopolist, and there would be no race. The winner-take-all system introduces competition between the two …rms, and although the social cost of such competition is very large (one product is never developed), the overall e¤ect can be positive.
Licensing
The baseline model abstract from licensing. Maurer and Scotchmer (2002) argue that the permissive regime is especially attractive in the presence Figure 2 : The winner-take-all system is preferable to the north-west of the curves corresponding to various degrees of the intensity of competitiion. of licensing. They envision a scenario in which the …rst inventor immediately licenses the innovation to its competitor, saving duplication costs and increasing the reward to the winner of the race. Both e¤ects favor the permissive regime: the former increases social welfare directly, the latter raises the incentive to innovate for any given level of monopoly and duopoly deadweight losses. As a consequence, the appropriate ratio test will become more di¢ cult to pass when licensing is possible.
This section con…rms this intuition, but highlights two important caveats. First, both additional e¤ects are related to duplication costs, and hence both vanish when duplication costs are negligible. In this case, the appropriate test remains (17) even with licensing. Second, Kaplow's test is re-obtained only in the extreme case in which duplication costs absorb expected duopoly pro…ts entirely and the …rst inventor has all the bargaining power in the licensing negotiation. 14 Before proceeding to demonstrate these results, we pause to discuss which type of licensing agreements should be considered in our framework. As is well known, licensing agreements can often be crafted anti-competitively. In particular, the …rst inventor could allow the licensee to practice the innovation only after some distant future date, or it could set a large royalty rate which increases the licensee's unit cost, and hence duopoly prices and profits. Such clauses, however, would have anti-competitive e¤ect and so might be struck down by antitrust authorities. Here, we assume that antitrust authorities perfectly enforce the 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of IP, which de…ne as potentially anti-competitive "those restraints that have adverse e¤ects on competition that would have occurred in the absence of the license" (Gilbert 1995) . Thus, we assume that the licensee can start to compete not later than it would, on average, have duplicated the innovation, and that duopoly prices under licensing cannot be greater that the prices that would arise under duplication. In other words, licensing takes place against an up-front payment, at a date`such that 1 e rr = r y +r = 1 : In view of these assumptions, the potential duplicator will have to choose between parallel development and licensing knowing that his decision will neither a¤ect the expected starting date of production -which in normalized time units equals 1 -nor the magnitude of duopoly pro…ts -d : The only e¤ect of licensing is to save duplication costs (1 )
r , which therefore represent the bargaining surplus. In the negotiation between the …rst inventor and the potential duplicator, the …rst inventor will get a share of the bargaining surplus and the laggard the remaining share (1 ), where re ‡ects the winner's bargaining power.
We can now turn to the comparison between the winner-take-all and the permissive regimes. The winner-take-all regime is una¤ected by the possibility of licensing, since licensing will never take place anyway. In the permissive regime, instead, we now have
and
Now, a rise in duplication costs increases both the pro…t incentive and the competitive threat. As a consequence, the greater are the duplication costs, the greater is the value of the duration of exclusivity necessary to induce the same incentives to innovate in the two regimes.
Turning to the welfare comparison, notice that duplication costs are no longer borne in the permissive regime. Social welfare therefore becomes:
Proceeding as above, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 5 Under competition-neutral licensing, the winner-take-all regime is preferable to the permissive regime in terms of social welfare if
When = 0 or = 0, the modi…ed ratio test under licensing is the same as with no licensing. The di¤erence between the two tests is small if is small. The main di¤erence between (29) and (18) is that an increase in the index of costliness of duplication now militates against the winner-takeall system. However, Kaplow's test is only re-obtained under the extreme assumptions = 1 (expected duopoly pro…ts are entirely absorbed by duplication costs) and = 1 (the …rst inventor has all the bargaining power in the licensing game). The intuition is that with = 1, the consolation prize vanishes and the …rst innovator obtains aggregate duopoly pro…ts; therefore, the incentives to innovate is given by industry pro…ts and Kaplow's test applies.
Free entry
There are two main di¤erences between our baseline model and that of La Manna et al. (1989) . First, we have assumed that only two …rms are engaged in research, while they assume that there is free entry in innovation. Second, we have assumed that R&D expenditures are a ‡ow cost that is sustained until the innovation is achieved, whereas they assumed that R&D expenditures are an up-front payment that is made once and for all. Which assumption is responsible for the di¤erent results we get? We argue that Kaplow's test is obtained only when both of the assumptions made by La Manna et al. (1989) hold. When either assumption is made, but not both, we obtain a modi…ed ratio test that is easier to pass that Kaplow's test, and possibly even of the test that is appropriate in our baseline model.
To proceed, in this sub-section we relax the assumption that only two …rms can conduct research. Instead, we analyze the case where the equilibrium number of …rms is determined by a free entry condition both in the innovation and the duplication stage. 15 The pro…t function of a representative …rm i is therefore i (x i ; X i ) =
With free entry into the innovation race, the equilibrium number of active …rms n and the individual research e¤orts x are determined simultaneously as the solution to the system comprising the …rst-order condition
and the zero-pro…t condition
As we have seen above, the consolation prize P L vanishes in the winnertake-all system. Free entry at the duplication stage, however, make the consolation prize vanish in the permissive regime as well: the …rm that loses the race gets zero reward, as at the duplication stage free entry brings the expected pro…t down to zero. As a consequence, the equilibrium conditions become:
Clearly, for the two systems to yield the same incentives to innovate, they must guarantee the same prize to the winner of the race.
In the winner-take-all system the prize to the winner is again given by equation (10). In the permissive regime, however, things are now slightly different. The aggregate duplication e¤ort is determined by conditions similar to (33) and (34), i.e.,
where n d is the number of …rms that participate in the duplication race, and
where Y = n d y denotes aggregate duplication e¤ort, where n d and y are the solution to the above system. Then, the prize to the winner in the permissive regime is again given by (8) 
Thus, social welfare in the permissive regime is
whereas in the winner-take-all regime it continues to be given by (11).
Proceeding as usual, we obtain:
Proposition 6 With free entry, the winner-take-all regime is preferable to the permissive regime in terms of social welfare if
Note that with homogeneous products and a linear demand curve, inequality (39) is always satis…ed. This means that the appropriate ratio test is now even easier to pass than in the baseline model.
Our result is based on the fact that, under free entry, expected pro…ts are brought down to zero at all stages. This implies that there is no second prize, which means that the negative e¤ect of the consolation prize in the permissive regime vanishes. Now, however, duplication costs are largest since they absorb all expected pro…ts upon duplication. The e¤ect of these duplication costs on the welfare comparison is now unambiguous, since they no longer have any positive e¤ect on the competitive threat. 16
R&D costs committed up front
In this sub-section, we consider a model where R&D expenditures are committed up front by the racing …rms. As before, such R&D expenditures determine the hazard rates of the Poisson processes describing the arrival of the innovation.
The comparison between the winner-take-all and the permissive regime is now modi…ed in two ways. First, there are no duplication costs, since duplication occurs as a result of the up-front R&D expenditure of the loser. Second, the consolation prize e¤ect loses some of its strength, since now the second prize somewhat stimulates the up-front investment in research: the more a …rm invests at the outset, the less it will have to wait to become duopolist upon losing the race.
Assume, for simplicity, that R&D expenditures is a linear function of R&D e¤orts. The expected pro…t of …rm i = A,B is
where c is the unit R&D cost. In the winner-take-all regime, P L = 0 and P W continues to be given by (10). In the permissive regime now the prizes to the winner and to the loser do not depend on imitation e¤ort, but on innovation e¤ort since the instantaneous probability that the innovation is duplicated is the same as the instantaneous probability that a …rm innovates for the …rst time. Hence
Note that P IID i;W does not depend on i's own e¤ort, but P IID i;L does. Accordingly, the …rst order condition in the permissive regime is now
(43) The additional term on the left-hand side re ‡ects the fact that by increasing its research e¤ort, a …rm now increases the value of the second prize to it, as it gets sooner to duopoly pro…ts in case it does not win the race.
In a symmetric equilibrium we have:
Proceeding in the standard way, we get the following result:
Proposition 7 When R&D costs are committed up front, the winner-takeall regime is preferable to the permissive regime in terms of social welfare if
The function (1 )(2 + ) decreases monotonically from 2 ( = 0) to 0 ( = 1). This means that, as usual, the winner-take-all system is more desirable when the innovation race is intense (i.e., x is large so that is large, too). Kaplow's test is re-obtained only for = 0. As soon as the industry does not stagnate in an equilibrium with zero research e¤orts, the appropriate test for the desirability of the winner-take-all system is more favorable than Kaplow's test.
Conclusion
What is the optimal allocation of prizes in an innovation race? In this paper, we have argued that the winner-take-all system is optimal in a broad set of circumstances. Our conclusion challenges the claim, which is gaining popularity among economists and lawyers, that a more permissive system is generally preferable. This emerging consensus rests upon the analysis of a series of rather special cases. All these special cases have in common the property that the welfare comparison among the two regimes turns on Kaplow's ratio test, which compares the deadweight loss per unit of pro…ts under monopoly and oligopoly. When …rms are engaged in an innovation race, however, the appropriate test generally di¤ers from Kaplow's, and may be much easier to pass.
How do previous papers arrive at the conclusion that Kaplow's test is the appropriate one? There have been various approaches:
(i ) One approach posits up-front R&D costs with free entry and constant returns to scale in research (La Manna et al. 1989 ). In this model, …rms sink R&D costs at the beginning of the race and cannot change their R&D e¤orts over time. As a result, when deciding how much to invest …rms take into account that they might get the …rst prize, or the second prize, or the third prize, etc. Free entry brings to equality total R&D expenditures and the expected aggregate pro…ts that can be earned on the market (ex-ante, all positions are open to each …rm). With constant returns to scale in research, aggregate R&D expenditure uniquely determines the probability of success. The problem then becomes that of choosing the regime that minimizes the deadweight losses per unit of pro…t, which is precisely what Kaplow's test is meant to …nd out. But if R&D costs are ‡ow costs that …rms can adjust over time (even if there is free entry), or the number of …rms engaged in the race is …xed (even with up-front R&D costs), things are di¤erent, as we have seen in subsection 5.3 and 5.4 above.
(ii) Another approach assumes that the …rst inventor engages in licensing, has all the bargaining power, and duplication costs are very large (Maurer and Scotchmer, 2002) . In a permissive regime, the …rst inventor has an incentive to license its innovation to potential duplicators. If by licensing the …rst inventor manages to appropriate industry pro…ts fully, the incentive to innovate will depend again on aggregate pro…ts and duplication costs will not be borne, so Kaplow's test applies. However, for the …rst inventor to obtain all industry pro…ts, it must have all the bargaining power and potential duplication costs must equal oligopoly pro…ts. These conditions are extreme; moreover, various factors may impede licensing agreements in practice.
(iii) Finally, a third approach uses a timeless, reduced-form model of the innovation race (Shapiro, 2006) . In this model, …rms may succeed simultaneously (a zero-probability event in continuous time), in which case it is assumed that Nature chooses which …rm is granted the monopoly. This, however, creates some ambiguity in the de…nition of …rst and second prize. For example, the …rst prize may be taken to be the pro…t to a sole innovator, and the second prize the expected pro…t accruing to each innovator when both succeed simultaneously. With this interpretation, the second prize is positive even in the winner-take-all system. More to the point, a …rm's e¤ort determines only whether it wins some positive prize: which one it will win depends only on the e¤ort exerted by its competitor. Under these somewhat arti…cal assumptions, the incentives to innovate is again give by the expected industry pro…ts, and is independent of their division and so Kaplow's test applies. But our analysis of the Poisson model with up front R&D costs reveals that a timeless model is an appropriate reduced-form only when the intensity of the race is close to zero. For fast races, the appropriate test is, once again, easier to pass than Kaplow's test.
That various sets of extreme assumptions lead to the same conclusion does not mean that the conclusion is a robust one. Generally speaking, the appropriate test for the optimality of the winner-take-all system di¤ers from Kaplow's test, and is much easier to pass. This memans that the winnertake-all system is optimal in a broad set of circumstances. Our analysis also highlights one key determinant of the welfare comparison, i.e., the intensity of the innovation race: in highly innovative industries, that is to say, it is quite likely that the optimal policy calls for the winner to take all.
Appendix
The proof of Lemma 1 and Propositions 2, 5, 6, and 7 follows.
Proof of lemma 1. Implicit di¤erentiation of (3) gives
and so the stability condition
Implicit di¤erentiation of (4) gives
and dx dP L = x P W P L c 0 (x i ) c 00 (x i ) (x i + x j + r)
By the stability condition, the denominator of these expressions is negative, whence the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 2. Using (7), (8) and (10); expression (14) can be re-written as follows: Note that must exceed the lead time (1 ) in the permissive regime by an amount that increases with duopoly pro…ts and duplication costs.
Using (11) and (12), one immediately sees that when the R&D e¤ort is the same across regimes, social welfare is greater under the winner-take-all regime if Inserting into this expression the value of that makes the incentives to innovate equal across regimes, one gets that the winner-take-all regime dominates in terms of social welfare if:
v ( Thus, in order to have the same incentives to innovate, we must have
Using (11) and (38), one immediately sees that when the R&D e¤ort is the same across regimes, social welfare is greater under the winner-take-all regime if Inserting into this expression the value of that makes the incentives to innovate indeed equal across regimes, one gets that the winner-take-all regime dominates in terms of social welfare if:
Simplifying and rearranging we get the result.
Proof of Proposition 7. In the winner-take-all system the equilibrium condition with contractual R&D costs is x + r r m = c (2x + r) 2 :
In order to get the same incentive to innovate as under the permissive regime, it must be: 
